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1 Introduction 
 
In addition to fiscally supporting police, courts, prisons, and other publicly provided 
methods for deterring crime, private individuals or entities may also invest in market-provisioned 
self-protection devices or services to mitigate their probability of victimization.  Common 
examples of such ‘private security’ efforts include, but are not limited to, the installation of 
residential burglar alarms, the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras by convenience 
stores, and the purchase of firearms and mace.   
Private security investments reflect society’s implicit ‘derived demand’ for offenses in 
the market model of crime (Ehrlich, 1981), and there has been a steady increase in the both the 
level and rate of such investments over the past several decades.  For instance, in the 1970s there 
were 1.4 public police officers for every private security officer, but this proportion fell to just 
0.33 in the 1990s (Blackstone & Hakim, 2010).   Private expenditures on self-protection are now 
larger than public expenditures used towards maintaining the criminal justice system.  Philipson 
& Posner (1996) estimate that annual expenditures on private protection amount to $300 billion, 
although this figure does not include the opportunity cost of some private security measures (e.g., 
avoiding travel through crime-prone areas) (Ayres & Levitt, 1996).     
It is well understood that private security efforts could either deter or displace crime 
depending on whether the investment is observable to potential offenders.  Unobservable 
investments, such as carrying concealed handguns or installing hidden theft recovery systems in 
cars, might lower the probability of victimization for unprotected targets (a positive externality) 
since criminals cannot readily ascertain which potential victims are using the device.  Overall 
crime rates may therefore fall in response to unobservable victim precautions.  Conversely, 
observable precautions, such as employing uniformed security guards or installing a security 
system along with a sign indicating its presence, might simply displace crime to unprotected 
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targets (a negative externality) assuming that the uptake of such investments is not sufficiently 
broad.   The concomitant effect on the overall crime rate may be negligible or even positive.1   
Despite the likely importance of self-protection in reducing victimization risks and the 
associated externalities, empirical evaluations of private security efforts (either observable or 
unobservable) remain sparse in the economics of crime literature.  Several studies rely on cross-
sectional survey data for a specific locale (such as a city, community, or transportation system) 
and often evaluate only a single type of precaution.2   Another body of literature employs 
aggregate-level data and using panel methods to estimate the effect of private security on crime––
in particular, laws allowing private citizens to carry concealed weapons.3   These studies also tend 
to consider only a single type of private precaution and, therefore, may also suffer from omitted 
variable bias if various types of self-protection are correlated with each other.    
This paper contributes to and expands upon the previous empirical literature on 
estimating the deterrent effect of private security measures by employing a rich, public dataset 
that has not been exploited in previous work.  Unlike most previous studies, the present analysis 
considers four separate measures of private security: security guards, detectives and investigators, 
security system installers, and locksmiths––as proxied by the employment levels in each group.  
The effects of laws allowing the concealed carrying of weapons (an unobservable precaution) are 
                                                 
1 Lacroix & Marceau (1995) present a theoretical analysis wherein the adoption of an observable private 
security measure may even induce crime at the protected location by signaling the presence of something 
valuable.   
2  Hakim & Shachmurove (1996) provide evidence that burglar alarms deter commercial burglaries.  
DiTella et al. (2006) (Argentinean data) find that private security guards deter the incidence of residential 
burglaries.  Armitage & Smithson (2007) (British data) conclude that gating residential back alleys reduces 
crime.  See Benson (1997, 1998) for cites to and discussion of earlier studies.     
3 See, e.g., Lott & Mustard (1996), Ayres & Donohue (2003), and Lott (2010).  Ayres & Levitt (1998) 
conclude that the (unobservable) Lojack anti-theft system deters auto thefts.  Gonzalez-Navarro (2008) 
(Mexican data) reaches a similar conclusion.  Benson & Mast (2001) find that some crimes are negatively 
correlated with the level of (possibly observable) security establishments or security personnel (in addition 
to concealed carry laws).  Priks (2009) (Swedish data) finds that the installation of (observable) 
surveillance cameras reduced crimes in subway stations with some displacement to surrounding areas.  
Cook & MacDonald (2010) report that the establishment of business improvement districts in Los Angeles 
correlate with fewer crimes and arrests without any displacement effects to adjacent areas.  Vollaard & van 
Ours (2010) (Dutch data) find that a national law requiring the installation of burglary-proof windows and 
doors in new residential houses lowered the incidence of burglary with ambiguous displacement effects.   
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also evaluated.   Since the market model suggests private security is endogenous to crime, the 
analysis relies primarily on dynamic panel data methods to derive consistent parameter estimates 
of the effect of self-protection measures.  The relationship between self-protection and Part II 
Index offense (arrest) data are also considered in order to provide exploratory evidence on the 
interaction between publicly and privately provisioned crime deterrence efforts.         
 The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 employs the market model to theoretically 
assess the relationship between self-protection and victimization risk and discusses conditions 
under which even observable precaution efforts may affect overall crime rates.  Section 3 reviews 
the data while Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology for estimating the supply of crime.  
Section 5 presents structural and instrumental variable estimates of the effect of private security 
on Part I Index offenses.  These results suggest that private security is in fact endogenous to crime 
and that some offenses are deterred by some types of private security.  Section 6 turns to Part II 
Index arrests and shows that the relationship between public and private deterrence efforts may be 
dependent on characteristics of the latter.   Section 7 provides concluding remarks.   
  
2 Theoretical framework––Isaac Ehrlich’s ‘market for offenses’ model and the 
relationship between private security efforts and crime rates 
 
Ehrlich (1981, 1982, 1996) extends Becker’s (1968) seminal theoretical work on 
modeling offender behavior to consider a ‘market model’ of crime.  In this model both the 
propensity of offenders to enter into criminal activity on the ‘supply’ side and potential victims to 
‘demand’ crime through their investments in private protection efforts are considered.  Following 
Becker (1968), the framework also models the role of government intervention through law 
enforcement via a social planner’s minimization of a social loss function relating to private losses 
of crime (including costs associated with private security efforts) and the costs of implementing 
various levels of certainty and severity of punishment, which act as a ‘tax’ on criminal activity.     
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Potential offenders maximize expected utility, which is a function of income, by devoting 
time to employment in either legal or illegal (criminal) income-generating activities.4  Expected 
income earned in criminal activities is a decreasing function of the perceived risk of being 
apprehended and convicted by public (collective) law enforcement and the level of private 
precautions undertaken by potential victims to protect themselves and their property.  Following 
Ehrlich, let  
 d pfp = -  (1) 
represent the net gain per offense where ( , , )i ld d w w x=  is the expected differential gain per 
offense on the margin as determined by the gross payoff from illegal activity ( iw ), the 
opportunity cost of the offender’s time in an alternative (legal) activity ( lw ) and private security 
taken by potential victims ( x ).  Assume 0
iwd > , 0lwd < , and 0dx <  (where subscripts 
denote partial derivatives).  The variables p  and f  indicate the probability of apprehension and 
the expected punishment per offense, respectively.   
Let ( )O p  denote the aggregate ‘supply-of-offenses’ schedule, which is an increasing 
function of the net gains per offense, or 0Op ³ .  Then write 
 ( ) ( ) ( )sq O O dp t= = - , (1) 
where ( )sq  is the quantity of crimes supplied and pft = .  The ‘derived-demand-for-offenses’ in 
turn represents the average potential payoff per offense at alternative offense rates (Ehrlich, 1981 
p. 309).  This potential payoff , d  , is the same as appears in the supply-of-offenses function and 
reflects in part the level of vulnerable assets maintained by potential victims.  Again, d  is also a 
function of victim expenditures on private security precautions.  Such expenditures might include 
burglar alarm systems, locks, guard dogs, safes, security guards, etc.  Assume that the average 
                                                 
4 As in Ehrlich & Saito (forthcoming), the model assumes that (1) all offenses are of the same ‘type’; (2) all 
potential offenders and victims are risk neutral; and (3) potential offenders and victims are distinguished by 
initial income levels; specifically, offenders have comparatively lower wealth levels and legitimate 
earnings opportunities both initially and in any equilibrium involving participation in crime.  
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perceived victimization risk is a function of the realized crime rate (Ehrlich, 1996 p. 49), or 
( )qx x= , which represents the demand function for optimal private security.  Equilibrium 
expenditures on private security efforts are increasing in the perceived victimization risk, or 
0qx ³ .  Substituting ( )qx  into d  gives  
 ( )( )dd D q= , (2) 
such that ( ) 0dqD £ .     
Equilibrium in the market model is determined where 
 s dq q( ) ( )= . (3) 
 
Let *q denote the crime rate that implicitly solves equation (3), which corresponds to the solution 
of a fixed-point problem (Ehrlich & Saito, forthcoming).5  The equilibrium of the virtual market 
model of crime may then be characterized as 
 * * *( ( ) ( ))q O D q qt= - . (4) 
 
Of primary interest here is examining the comparative statistics results associated with an 
exogenous increase in private security efforts independent of any changes in public enforcement 
or any change in the crime rate itself.  For example, such exogenous variation may stem from 
technological advances in private security systems or changes in regulations governing the private 
security industry.   
Let * *( )d D qº , which upon substitution into equation (4) gives rise to the following 
result. 
Result 1.  An exogenous increase in the level of (per-capita) private security expenditures 
results in a non-positive change in the equilibrium crime rate. 
 
Proof:  Applying the envelope theorem to equation (4) gives 
                                                 
5 An equilibrium solution is ensured to exist so long as D pf(0) 0- ³ , and the equilibrium will be unique 
so long as qdO dq D O( )/ 0pp = < , i.e., the net return from crime turns negative as the crime rate rises 
above its equilibrium value (Ehrlich & Saito, forthcoming).   
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Result 1 demonstrates, all else equal, that an exogenous increase in private security precautions 
lowers the equilibrium offense rate, i.e., effectuates a deterrent effect.  The various partial 
derivatives in equation (5) inform the magnitude of the deterrent effect.  Ceteris paribus, the 
deterrent effect will be larger (i.e., more negative): (1)  the more elastic the supply-of-offenses 
function with respect to the expected differential gain per offense; and (2) the greater the 
(negative) impact of private security efforts on the expected differential gain per offense.6   
Furthermore, the deterrent effect of private security will be smaller the greater the response of 
public enforcement to increases in the crime rate.     
 Since the optimal private security function is increasing in the crime rate, it is possible 
that observed changes in private security efforts (or expenditures) could be positively correlated 
with observed changes in crime.  Indeed, this is the same type of endogeneity bias that confounds 
empirically indentifying the deterrent effect of police or incarceration rates in aggregate data.   
The endogenous relationship between crime and private security can be readily demonstrated in 
the context of the market model considered above.   
Consider Figure 1.  Assume there is no instantaneous impact of a change in the level of 
per-capita private security efforts on any public enforcement efforts.  Suppose there is an 
exogenous decrease in lw  due to, say, an unexpected labor demand shock that lowers ‘legitimate’ 
wages; thus ,0 ,1l lw w> .  This change, operating through a positive effect on 0d , shifts both the 
                                                 
6 These results can also be seen by rewriting equation (5) in elasticity form: 
O
q
eq
e
*
,
,1
x
tx
¶ =¶ + , 
where Oe , 0x <  denotes the elasticity of the supply of offenses with respect to private security efforts and 
qe , 0t >  the elasticity of public enforcement efforts with respect to the crime rate.  This expression is 
arguably more relevant from an empirical perspective since data on d  are rarely available or, for some 
offenses (e.g., murders committed as part of so-called ‘crimes of passion’), not even observable.    
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initial supply-of-offense ( 0p ) and derived-demand-for-offenses ( dd D q0 0 ,0( )= ) schedules  to 
the right and puts upward pressure on the equilibrium crime rate.  In response, potential victims 
increase their expenditures on private security ( 1 0x x> ) since, by assumption, 0qx ³ .  But an 
increase in (per capita) private security expenditures, because of its negative effect on d , would 
shift the supply and demand schedules to the left.   Thus, a decrease in lw  simultaneously exerts 
both a ‘direct’ outward shift (through d ) and an ‘indirect’ inward shift (through x ) of the supply 
and demand schedules in the market model.  
However, as shown in Figure 1, the net effect of the countervailing shifts in supply and 
demand, however, will still be a rightward shift in both curves.  The equilibrium crime rate 
increases from 0Q  to 1Q  ( *0q  to *1q ).  Furthermore, at Q1  optimal private security expenditures 
must be greater than at point Q0  since 0qx ³  and * *1 0q q> .   These effects also necessarily 
imply that 1 0d d>  (or 1 0p p> ) at point Q1 .  These results are formally proved below.7 
Result 2.  An exogenous decrease in the opportunity costs of committing crime necessarily 
results in 1 0d d> , which implies an increase in both the equilibrium crime rate and the level of 
(per capita) private security expenditures.           
 
Proof:  With little loss in generality, following Ehrlich (1996, n. 4) let 0d  and 1d take the 
following functional forms: 
 
0 ,0 ,0 0
1 ,1 ,1 1.
i l
i l
d w w
d w w
x
x
= - -
= - -  (6) 
Assume that the gross payoffs from crime are unchanging, or ,0 ,1i iw w= .  An exogenous 
decrease in the legal wage implies that 
 ,1 ,0l lw w<  (7) 
and, ceteris paribus, shifts the net returns schedule to the right, or 1 0d d> .  A new equilibrium is 
established at Q1  (see Figure 2).  By assumption 1 0x x>  at Q1  since the derived-demand-for-
offenses schedule is increasing in q .  But suppose instead that  
 d d1 0£  (8) 
following a decrease in the legal wage, which implies that the equilibrium crime does not increase 
relative to its initial value.  Rewrite equation (8) as  
                                                 
7 The same effect would apply to a change in any other variable that parameterizes the market model and 
increases the net returns to crime (or vice versa).  The present discussion focuses on a decrease in legal 
wages only for the sake of demonstration.   
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i l i l
i i l l
l l
l l
w w w w
w w w w
w w
w w
,1 ,1 1 ,0 ,0 0
,1 ,0 ,1 ,0 1 0
,1 ,0 1 0
,0 ,1 1 0
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
0 0
x x
x x
x x
x x
- - £ - -
 - - - - - £
 - + - + £
 - £ -
 (9) 
It must be the case that 1 0x x£  if equation (9) is satisfied.  Substituting this condition into 
equation (10) shows that its inequality constraint can only be satisfied if w w,1 ,0£  , which is a 
contradiction.  ■  
 
The analysis in Figure 1 and above suggests that it might be the norm rather than the 
exception to empirically observe a positive correlation between private security and crime.  Such 
observation, however, would not reflect the effect of security on crime but rather their joint 
determination.  Indeed, Clotfelter (1978) finds that the probability of adopting private security is 
positively correlated with the probability of victimization for almost all of the self-protection 
efforts he considers, so endogeneity is a real concern from an empirical perspective.  Determining 
the actual causal effect of private security on crime requires identifying the supply-of-offenses 
schedule off of shifts in the derived-demand-for-offenses schedule induced by factors that are 
strictly exogenous to the market model.  Any empirical evaluation of deterrence from private 
security efforts must therefore take into account the potential endogeneity between security and 
crime.   
2.1 Observable private security efforts and the market model of crime 
The market model of crime presented above implicitly takes potential victims as 
homogeneous (i.e., in an ex ante sense).  This assumption implies that, in equilibrium, all 
potential victims will invest in the same level of private security efforts.  Any changes in crime 
rates stemming from increased private security efforts or expenditures therefore correspond to 
‘general’ deterrence, or reductions in overall crime stemming from fewer offenses being 
committed against both protected and unprotected targets.  
 The recent theoretical (Shavell, 1991; Hui-Wen & Png, 1994; Helsley & Strange, 1999, 
2004) and empirical literatures on private security focus on unobservable protection efforts such 
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as the carrying of concealed weapons or the use of hidden theft recovery systems (e.g., Lojack).8  
These precautions could result in general deterrence because of the positive externality that arises 
from criminals being unable to determine which potential victims have actually adopted the 
effort.  Observable private security efforts, such as a sign indicating the presence of a burglar 
alarm system, may protect the specific target employing them, but criminals might simply divert 
their efforts towards visibly unprotected targets.  As a result, aggregate crime rates, which are the 
focus of the market model, might not be affected by the adoption of such precautions.     
Benson & Mast (2001), however, posit several theoretical avenues by which even highly 
visible private security efforts may still effectuate general deterrence and, therefore, be evaluated 
under the market model.  First, if observable private security efforts result in criminals diverting 
their efforts between protected and unprotected targets, entrepreneurs may recognize new sales 
opportunities and offer more security services to potential targets.  If such entrepreneurial efforts 
are successful, the number of protected targets with observable security efforts could expand over 
time, perhaps to an extent that “the expected cost of searching for targets and/or committing 
crimes could rise, making potential criminals less likely to become actual criminals.”9   
Second, sellers of private security services may be unable to exclude some non-payers 
from reaping some benefits of the sales made to other customers.  For example, some potential 
crime victims may be able to take advantage of observable security investments made by others, 
and if so, then general deterrence effects may arise as a positive externality.  Benson & Mast (p. 
730) note: 
Firms in a shopping or entertainment area may employ security primarily to prevent shoplifting, 
vandalism, and employee theft, for instance, but a potential victim of robbery or rape may choose 
to shop or socialize in that area to take advantage of the security presence.  If a substantial portion 
                                                 
8 See supra notes 2 and 3 for cites to recent empirical studies.     
9 Benson & Mast (2001).  DiTella et al. (2006) present evidence that suggests the adoption of private 
security by higher-income households leads to more crime being diverted to lower-income households, 
who tended to adopt private security and a much smaller rate.  An implication of this finding is that if 
lower-income households could afford private security (or where provisioned with it through government 
subsidy), then the displacement would not have occurred, which is consistent Benson & Mast’s argument.  
See also Cook & MacDonald (2010, p. 14: “If adoption of effective technology is broad enough, the scope 
for displacement . . . is limited.”).      
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of potential victims behave this way, robberies and/or rapes could be reduced because the cost for 
potential criminals of finding an easy target is higher.    
                  
Third, purchasers of observable security efforts might recognize the presence of the 
above positive externalities and internalize them, e.g., by incorporating the cost of providing a 
secure environment into the price charged for the final product, such as a higher ticket price at a 
movie theater.  In this case “[t]he general deterrence impact could still arise, but it would be paid 
for by those who benefit from it.”10  And fourth, some ostensibly ‘observable’ private security 
efforts, such as plainclothes security guards or detectives, could in fact be difficult for potential 
criminals to detect.  Uncertainty about where such security efforts are deployed could lead to a 
general deterrence effect.11   
 Cook & MacDonald (2010) also offer some insights into how observable precautions 
might induce general deterrence.   Criminals may be heterogeneous in their skills, and observable 
precautions may affect unskilled criminals more than skilled ones.  For instance, use of a steering 
wheel lock may lower aggregate auto theft rates by deterring many ‘joyriding’ thefts (which tend 
to be committed by younger, less experienced criminals) but have little effect on the behavior of 
higher-skilled professional car thieves who fence auto body parts.  Owners of higher-valued 
vehicles (or property in general) may also be more likely to adopt security measures, thereby 
forcing criminals to divert their efforts towards less lucrative unprotected targets.  If the return 
from committing crime against these latter targets is sufficiently low, criminals may be better off 
seeking out legitimate employment.     
In summary, the potential for even ‘visible’ private security efforts to induce general (as 
well as specific) deterrence allows even these types of precautions to be analyzed in the general 
context of the market model.  The following section discusses data that can be used to 
operationalize the market model in order to empirically evaluate the relationship between private 
security efforts and crime.   
                                                 
10 Benson & Mast (2001). 
11 Id. 
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3 Data 
Previous empirical research on private security efforts and crime have relied on both 
individual-level data (obtained from surveys) and aggregate-level data.  While some individual-
level studies may consider a number of private security efforts, the data are typically measured at 
a single point in time.  The cross-sectional estimates obtained from these studies may not control 
for a variety of unobservable factors that may influence both crime rates and the propensity to 
adopt private security, thereby leading to biased inference.  Furthermore, the extent to which the 
results from these studies may generalize to other groups periods (be they proximate or 
otherwise) is uncertain.   
Aggregate-level studies, which typically employ pooled cross-section time series (panel) 
data, have allowed researchers to better control for omitted variable bias through estimation of 
fixed effects models.  These studies, however, have not controlled for the wide range of private 
security efforts due to data limitations.  Benson & Mast (2001) use county-level data obtained 
from the US Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns (CBP) dataset, which reports the number 
of establishments specializing in ‘security and detective services.’  However, the CBP dataset 
does not contain measures of any other forms of private security.  
 This study employs aggregate state-level data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) on private security efforts that have not been considered in previous studies.  The data are 
collected in the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) series.  The OES dataset provides 
estimates of the number of persons employed (and wage estimates) for approximately 800 
occupations based on a series of establishment-level surveys.13   Unlike the CBP dataset used by 
Benson & Mast (2001), the OES dataset reflects employment in private security occupations 
                                                 
13 The OES dataset classifies an ‘employee’ as any full- or part-time worker paid a wage or salary.  The 
dataset does not reflect the self-employed, owners and partners in non-incorporated firms, household 
workers, or unpaid family workers.   See BLS (2010) for further details.   
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outside of those firms specializing in providing security services.  For example, some private 
retail establishments (such as department stores) may maintain their own security personnel rather 
than contracting out for such services.  Similarly, various government agencies might recruit, 
train, and retain their own security personnel rather than rely on a specialized private security 
firm.14   
 The OES dataset also goes beyond the CBP dataset in that they measure employment in 
several relevant occupations. 15  The CPB dataset groups together private guard and detective 
services, which is a potential shortcoming since the duties performed by those two employment 
groups are quite different.  Annual OES employment estimates are separately available for 
security guards, private detectives and investigators, security and fire alarm system installers, and 
locksmiths and safe repairers.   Employment trends in these occupations should reflect variation 
over time in the extent those private security efforts are acquired and deployed by end users 
across states.16    
 Private security services and devices are, of course, employed across a wide range of 
industries.  Table 1 presents national-level employment estimates for the five largest industry 
employers of each OES private security group.  Not surprisingly, the single largest employment 
industry is ‘investigation and security services,’ which comprises about 79.7 percent of the 
employment in those industries listed in Table 1.17  ‘Government’ (including schools) is the 
                                                 
14 These data have not been widely used in academic studies; the majority of their (few) econometric uses 
have been in the labor economics literature. See, e.g., Dey et al. (2009), Dey & Stewart (2008), and 
Abraham & Speltzer (2010).   
15 The OES does not release state-level occupation-specific employment estimates by industry (such 
estimates are available only nationally).  Thus, one cannot determine the number of, say, security guards 
employed within retail establishments at the state level. 
16 Employment levels for private guards and detectives will obviously represent the extent to which those 
efforts are directly acquired and deployed by the purchasers of those services.  The relationship between 
employment and deployment levels pertaining, e.g., to alarm systems may be somewhat less direct, but 
changes in employment levels are still likely to reflect changes in the extent to which alarms, security 
systems, safes, etc. are purchased and utilized by end users (the estimated effects of private security on 
crime are identified off of within-state variations in these measures).        
17 This figure is likely biased upward (and all others downwards) since the OES data are effectively 
capturing counts of employees that are ‘directly’ employed by each industry.  It is almost certain that many 
of the persons counted in the ‘investigation and security services’ industry are actually deployed in other 
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second largest, comprising about 9.3 percent.  Other notable industries include ‘legal services’ in 
the case of private detectives and investigators and ‘hospitals’ in the case of locksmiths and safe 
repairers.   
 While the OES dataset clearly provide several distinct advantages, Abraham & Speltzer 
(2010) highlight several issues that may hinder its application to any econometric analyses 
relying on the time series dimension of the data.18   Before 1996 establishments in specific 
industries were surveyed on a three-year rotating cycle, but since then all industries are sampled 
in each year.  However, save for the federal and state government ‘industries,’ the largest 
establishments within each industry are still surveyed only once every three years.     
 OES employment estimates for a given year are derived from panels of establishment 
surveys taken over prior years to ensure that large establishments are sampled.  Prior to 2002, 
estimates were based on the current year’s survey panels plus the previous two year’s (each panel 
consisting of about 400,000 establishments across all industries), with establishments assigned an 
October, November, or December reference date.  Beginning in 2002, the OES survey moved to a 
design using six semi-annual panels (each consisting of about 200,000 establishments) with each 
establishment assigned a May or November reference date.19  As such, ensuring that a given 
year’s estimates reflect the largest establishments in a given industry comes at the cost of those 
estimates not reflecting data pertaining exclusively to that year (which in turn makes it less likely 
                                                                                                                                                 
industries (e.g., government) through outsourcing (contracting with security firms).   Regardless, these data 
may give a rough approximation of the rank order (i.e., in terms of employment intensity) of those 
industries (outside of ‘investigation and security services’) that employ and outsource private security 
services.   
18 Indeed, the BLS does not ‘encourage’ using OES data for conducting time series analysis and urges 
researchers that choose to do so “to note the changes in survey procedures and the limits of the methods 
used with a pooled sample” (BLS 2010).  As discussed herein, it does not appear that these changes have 
had a large effect on the estimates for the occupational classes considered in this analysis, and the BLS 
acknowledges that “comparisons of occupations [over time] that are not affected by classification changes 
may be possible if the methodological assumptions hold.” (Id.)  Furthermore, the econometric methodology 
employed herein (which relies on panel data methods as opposed to pure time series analysis) should help 
to account for some of the shortcomings in the OES data (bearing in mind the BLS’s warnings regarding 
these methods).    
19 So, e.g., based on the current OES sampling design, annual estimates pertaining to May, 2008 are derived 
from data for the ‘current panel’ (dated May 2008) and the five previous panels (November 2005, May 
2006, November 2006, May 2007, and November 2007), for six semi-annual panels in total. 
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that the data are able to capture actual year-to-year changes).  The estimates, however, are 
benchmarked to the average of the most recent May and November employment levels.             
 Changes in industry classification schemes used in constructing the OES dataset may be 
another problem.  In 1999, the OES survey changed from its own survey-specific occupational 
coding system to the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system, and in 1999 it changed 
from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system to the North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS).  These changes may make it difficult to make meaningful 
comparisons in the OES employment estimates over time.  For example, only about half of all 
surveyed establishments could be assigned NAICS codes based upon their earlier SIC 
classification (Abraham & Speltzer, 2010).   
 This study uses OES data beginning in 1999, which corresponds to the earliest year for 
which employment estimates for all four of the above-mentioned private security occupations are 
available, through 2006.  Figure 2 graphs the national-level OES employment levels for the four 
private security occupation classes over the sample period.  Most of the series display a relatively 
stable pattern over the sample period, suggesting that the changes in the occupational 
classification schemes underlying the OES survey in 1999 and 2002 did not have a large effect on 
these employment estimates.  The exception is the alarm and security system installer series.  In 
the first three years of the sample (1999-2001) there is a marked peak in the series that occurs in 
2000.  Variation in the number of state cells containing employment estimates over these years 
appears to explain some of this movement.  Data are available for 22 states in 1999, but this 
number increased to 38 states (an increase of 72 percent) in 2000.  In 2001, however, the number 
of state-cells with usable observations then falls to 32.   
There is a noticeable upward trend in the alarm and security system installer series after 
2001.  One possible explanation for this effect is the adoption of the NAICS system by the OES 
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in 2002.  However, this explanation does not seem especially compelling given the smoother 
year-to-year patterns in the other series.  Another possible explanation is that the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks increased demand for private security, especially the demand for security 
and alarm systems. 21   
 
4 Empirical specification 
Let j  index the four OES private security occupation groups.  The basic linear regression 
model (which corresponds to the supply-of-offenses schedule in the market model) takes the 
following dynamic, double-logarithmic form:  
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where a  and i t,e  denote the constant and random error term, respectively.  The subscript 
i {1, , 51}=   indexes states (including the District of Columbia) and t {1999, ,2006}=   
years.   The variables iq  and tl  denote vectors of state and year indicators, respectively.22  Table 
2 presents descriptive statistics for select covariates used in estimating equation (10).  These 
variables are discussed further below.   
The dependent variable, i tO , , denotes the reported number of Uniform Crime Report 
(UCR) Part I offenses per 100,000 state residents. i tO , 1-  is the once-lagged value of the 
dependent variable, which is employed as a regressor.  Part I offenses consist of both violent 
(murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property (burglary, larceny, and auto theft) 
crimes.  Specifications using total violent or property offenses are not considered since the former 
                                                 
21 Dain & Brennan (2003) discuss the increasing liability of property owners for failing to provide security 
to patrons following the September 11, 2001 attacks.   
22 State-specific time trends are not included in the regression model for two reasons.  First, given that 
relatively short length of the panel, inclusion of these trends along with state and year indicators would 
likely over-parameterize the regression equation, reducing the efficiency of the estimates.  Second, as 
discussed below, there is a concern with instrument proliferation when using dynamic panel data 
estimators; dropping state-specific trends reduces the instrument set considerably.       
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is dominated by assaults and the latter by larcenies; there is also little or no reason to weigh the 
individual crime categories equally.   
 The variable i tD , 1-  denotes a vector of ‘public’ deterrence variables, which––according 
to the market model (see equation (5))––may influence the impact of private security.  These 
measures include per-capita measures of police employment and prisoners (i.e., the incarceration 
rate) as well as offense-specific arrest rates.   These variables are lagged one year to mitigate 
simultaneity bias.  The variable i tX ,  is a vector of other covariates typically included in crime 
studies (per-capita income, population density, poverty rate, unemployment rate, and percent 
black).23   All other Greek letters denote (vectors of) coefficients to be estimated.    
 The variable ji tPrivSec
( )
,  denotes employment in the thj  OES private security group, 
expressed on a per-capita basis.  The j( )b  coefficients represent the associated crime rate 
elasticity measured with respect to a one percentage point change in the thj  employment class.   
An estimate of j( )b  that is negative and statistically significant is interpreted as evidence of a 
(general) deterrent effect of that private security effort.   
 Another private precaution taken against crime is the ownership of weapons, particularly 
handguns.  Allowing private citizens to carry concealed (unobservable) handguns may induce 
general deterrence.  A large and contentious empirical literature debates the efficacy of concealed 
carry laws (CCLs) in reducing crimes, with some studies finding large negative effects (consistent 
with deterrence) and others finding no effects or even positive effects.24   Following this 
literature, equation (10) includes a dummy variable reflecting the presence of a law allowing 
citizens to carry concealed handguns.  This variable takes a value of one in the first full year 
following the legal adoption of the law and in each subsequent year the law is in effect.    
                                                 
23 The logarithmic transformation is applied only to per-capita income and population density and not to the 
other measures in i tX ,  since they are defined in percentage terms. 
24 See Lott (2010) for citations to and critical discussion of these various studies.   
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5 Estimation results 
5.1 Treating private security as exogenous to crime 
 Equation (10) is estimated via Newey-West regression, which takes the private security 
(and all other) variables as conditionally exogenous.  The Newey-West estimator provides test 
statistics that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary form.  In 
implementing the estimator, the maximum order of significant autocorrelation in the error terms 
is set equal to one.      
Table 3 presents the estimation results.  The elasticity estimates for private guards are 
consistently negative and statistically significant in the burglary and larceny specifications.  A 
one percent increase in per-capita private security guards is associated with a 0.8 percent decrease 
in per-capita burglaries and larcenies.   The estimated elasticity on private detectives is negative 
in five out of the seven specifications, but none of these estimates is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  There are also no statistically significant estimates pertaining to security 
system installers or locksmiths.  The estimated elasticities pertaining to security system installers 
(locksmiths) take a negative sign in only four (three) specifications.  The CCL coefficient takes a 
positive sign in each specification and is statistically significant for murder, assault, and burglary.   
This finding may suggest that CCL laws increase crime or that such laws tend to be passed in 
states with high crime rates.   
 The other coefficient estimates are generally consistent with expectations.   The lagged 
dependent variable is positively and significantly correlated with crime in all specifications 
except murder.  The (lagged) per-capita police employment elasticities are negative in five out of 
the seven specifications and statistically significant for robbery and auto theft.  A one percent 
increase in the (lagged) police rate is associated with a 0.32 (0.30) percent decrease in per-capita 
robberies (auto thefts).   
The (lagged) incarceration rate is negatively correlated with crime in only three cases.  
The incarceration elasticity is negative and statistically significant in the murder specification and 
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positive and statistically significant in the auto theft specification.  One possible explanation for 
these ‘perverse’ positive estimates (as well as those associated with the police rate and arrest rate) 
is that lagging the incarceration rate does not adequately control for simultaneity bias.  For 
instance, residual autocorrelation in the error terms disqualifies the use of deterrence lags to 
address endogeneity, which might explain in part the positive and/or statistically insignificant 
estimates on the various deterrence measures.   
5.2 Treating private security as endogenous to crime 
The theoretical framework considered in Section 2 and some of the previous results 
suggest that Newey-West estimates of private security effects could be inconsistent as they do not 
address the potential underlying endogeneity bias.  Determining the uncontaminated causal effect 
of private security effects on crime therefore necessitates ‘breaking’ the simultaneity between 
crime and private security, or employing an empirical strategy that exploits exogenous shifts in 
the derived-demand-for-crime schedule in order to identify the supply-of-offenses schedule.   
 While many studies in the empirical economics of crime literature address endogeneity 
concerns (whether they be in regard to deterrence, labor market, or other factors), an ongoing 
difficulty with these efforts is the identification of appropriate instrumental variables.  In this 
regard, recent studies in this literature (e.g., Moody & Marvell 2008, Saridakis & Spengler 2009) 
employ so-called ‘dynamic GMM’ estimators developed, inter alia, by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), 
Arellano & Bond (1991), Arellano & Bover (1995), and Blundell & Bond (1998).  These 
estimators rely on instruments ‘internal’ to the model (i.e., the instruments are derived as lagged 
levels or lagged differences of the endogenous regressors), which obviates the need to ‘find’ 
instruments (assuming any exist).   Statistical tests can then be conducted to explore the 
performance of the instruments in terms of their validity and relevance.  Dynamic GMM 
estimators are also specifically designed to address a number of econometric and data issues 
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relevant to this study25–– in particular, the dynamic bias in fixed effects models with lagged 
dependent variables (Nickell, 1981).  The potential for dynamic bias that is particularly relevant 
to the panels with a large number of groups relative to periods, as is the case here.   Dynamic 
GMM estimators account for this bias by also instrumenting the lagged dependent variable.    
 The predominant dynamic GMM estimators are ‘difference-GMM’ and ‘system-GMM.’   
The difference-GMM estimator applies lagged levels of the endogenous variables as instruments 
in a first-differenced fixed effects model.  System-GMM combines the first-differenced model 
with the same model in levels and uses lagged differences of the endogenous variables for the 
differenced equation.   
Although the system-GMM is asymptotically more efficient relative to difference-GMM, 
the difference-GMM is preferable in the present context.  The system-GMM estimator requires 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with unobserved state fixed effects––a condition that is met 
if the time series is stationary.  In principle, panel unit root tests could be employed to determine 
stationarity, but such tests would be expected to be very low-powered with the use of only six 
years of data.  Since difference-GMM, by definition, relies on a first-differenced specification, all 
nonstationary variables are transformed to stationary ones (assuming they follow an I(1)process), 
thereby making the estimator less sensitive to initial conditions.         
 Inference with dynamic GMM estimators is affected by the instrument count (Roodman, 
2008, 2009).  The number of instruments generated using these methods is increasing in the time 
(and group) dimension of the panel, and inference in finite samples is biased when the number of 
instruments becomes ‘large’ (i.e., approaches the sample size).  The relative efficiency of system-
GMM is achieved in part through the use of additional instruments.  Given the relatively short 
                                                 
25 Specifically, these estimators are applicable to applications involving:  (1) ‘large N, small T’ panels; (2) a 
linear functional relationship; (3) a single dynamic, left-hand-side variable (which depends on its own past 
realizations; (4) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous (i.e., correlated with past and possibly 
current realizations of the error); (5) fixed group effects; and (6) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
within (but not across) groups (Roodman, 2009).  All of these aspects are applicable in the present case.    
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time dimension of the panel and only 51 potential groups,26 difference-GMM is likely a better 
option relative to system-GMM for obtaining valid inference.      
Table 4 presents one-step difference-GMM estimates of the relevant analog to equation 
(10).27  All four private security measures are treated as endogenous variables.  In addition, the 
CCL law, police rate, prison rate, crime-specific arrest rate, and lagged dependent variable are 
assumed to be endogenous or predetermined, so all of these measures are instrumented as well.28   
The ‘GMM-style’ instruments for the various endogenous and predetermined measures 
are their respective lagged levels.  The maximum number of the relevant lags is set to two in 
order to restrict the size of the instrument set.29  Following standard practice, all other covariates 
used in estimating equation (10) (which are assumed to be strictly exogenous) are used as 
additional (non-excluded) instruments.30   
5.2.1 Evaluating the instruments 
 Before proceeding to the point estimates, consider the regression diagnostics given at the 
bottom of Table 4.  All seven models are statistically significant (as indicated by the F-statistics).  
Although there are more instruments than groups (which is not the ideal), the difference is not 
very large.  Either the Sargan or Hansen test can be used to evaluate the overidentifying 
                                                 
26 Because of missing data, the number of groups available for estimation is less than 51.  This fact also 
suggests favoring the use of difference-GMM to economize on instruments.     
27 The covariance matrix of dynamic GMM estimators can be obtained through the ‘one-step’ or ‘two-step’ 
option (see Roodman, 2009 for further details), the latter being asymptotically more efficient.   Arellano & 
Bond (1991) use Monte Carlo methods to show that two-step estimation of the difference-GMM model 
results in severely downward biased standard error estimates.  Windmeijer (2005) offers a correction, but in 
the instant case this approach resulted in many models failing to estimate, thereby forcing reliance on the 
one-step estimator.  Blundell & Bond (1998), however, show that one-step standard errors are virtually 
unbiased for moderately sized samples.  Furthermore, the estimated standard errors on all the difference-
GMM estimates presented herein are obtained using a cluster-robust correction, with the clustering applied 
to the group (state) level.    
28 It may be that some of the deterrence measures are not endogenous to some crime measures.  For 
instance, because murders comprise only a small portion of incarcerated offenders, it may be more accurate 
to regard prison population as exogenous in the murder regression.  Nonetheless, the same treatment is 
applied across the specifications for the sake of comparison and consistency.    
29 Another way to reduce the number of instruments is to ‘collapse’ them (Roodman, 2009).  However, 
restricting the lag lengths resulted in a smaller set of instruments.    
30 The state fixed effects are netted out due to differencing, and as such, state dummies are not used in the 
difference-GMM model.  However, the year dummies are still employed as non-excluded instruments.   
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restrictions; however, the former is less susceptible to bias resulting from using a larger 
instrument set.31  The Saragn test is significant in the rape, assault, and auto theft regressions, 
which suggests potential model misspecification.   As such, these three models will not be 
discussed further.    
 Arrelano & Bond (1991) note that serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term i t,e  
may cause some of the lagged instruments to be invalid.  The authors develop a test serial 
correlation that is applied to the differenced residuals.  First-order (AR(1) ) serial correlation is 
expected in the differenced residuals, and this result is borne out in the murder and larceny 
regressions.  However, the AR(1)  test is not particularly important because the validity of the 
instruments depends on whether there is serial correlation in the levels of the residuals, which can 
be determined by testing for AR(2)  in the differenced residuals.  This latter test is insignificant in 
all cases, which indicates that the instruments are not rendered invalid from serial correlation.   
 Instruments must be relevant in addition to being valid.   Bobba & Coviello (2007, p. 
303) note that: 
 In a multivariate panel data framework it is not clear how to test for weak instruments,  
hence we use the known bias in Difference GMM by comparing its sample performances with 
alternative estimators with known properties in dynamic panel data . . . .       
 
Specifically, following a procedure suggested by Bond et al. (2001), Bobba & Coviello test for 
weak instruments in difference-GMM by comparing its estimated autoregressive coefficient (i.e., 
the coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable) with corresponding within-group 
(lower bound) and pooled (upper bound) estimates.  If the difference-GMM autoregressive 
coefficient is smaller than the within-group estimate, then the difference-GMM estimator is likely 
                                                 
31 The Hansen test is severely weakened (meaning that it will fail to reject a false null hypothesis) when the 
instrument count is relatively large.  According to Roodman (2009), a Hansen-test p-value of even 0.25 
with a relatively large instrument set could be indicative of weak test.  In the present case, the estimated p-
values for the Hansen test were well above this level (in some instances taking ‘perfect’ 1.0 value, which 
Roodman characterizes as a ‘telltale’ sign of a weak Hansen test).  It is thus unlikely that the Hansen test 
can be relied upon for these estimations.  And although the Sargan test (unlike the Hansen test) is not 
robust to heteroskedasticity, this problem is likely to be of relatively less importance here, and as such, the 
Sargan test is reported for all estimations.       
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to be seriously downward biased.  This result would suggest that the instruments are only weakly 
correlated with the endogenous regressors (Bond et al. 2001, p. 7).   
The difference-GMM autoregressive coefficients in Table 4 all lie between their 
respective lower and upper bounds.  This finding suggests that there is no weak instruments 
problem affecting the difference-GMM estimates and, therefore, that those estimates do not suffer 
from (downward) finite sample bias.  The following subsection further evaluates the difference-
GMM estimates.     
5.2.2 The difference-GMM estimates 
 
The top portion of Table 4 presents the difference-GMM estimates.  Again, all reported t-
statistics reflect standard errors adjusted for generalized heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  
First consider the murder regression.  While none of the Newey-West private security 
employment estimates were statistically significant, the instrumented private detectives and 
investigators elasticity remains negative ( = -0.15) and is almost four times larger in magnitude 
relative to the Newey-West elasticity.  Furthermore, the difference-GMM estimate of this 
elasticity is statistically significant at the 1 percent level with instrumenting whereas the Newey-
West estimate is insignificant.  As suggested by the market model, the Newey-West estimate 
might suffer from endogeneity bias that operates in a positive direction (e.g., higher murder rates 
may result in greater employment of private detectives and investigators).  On the other hand, 
instrumenting causes the security guard and alarm system elasticities to turn from negative to 
positive, although both estimates remain statistically insignificant.   
 Similar to the Newey-West results, none of the difference-GMM private security 
employment estimates are statistically significant in the robbery regression.   However, 
instrumenting results in the estimated security guard and private detective elasticities to become 
more negative.  The security alarm elasticity turns from positive to negative after instrumenting.  
The locksmith elasticity remains positive and is larger in magnitude than the Newey-West 
estimate, but it is still statistically insignificant.   While these results, of course, should only be 
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regarded as tentative, they also suggest that the Newey-West estimates may suffer from 
simultaneity bias.   
 The difference-GMM security guard elasticity in the burglary regression remains 
negative and is 1.8 times larger in magnitude relative to the Newey-West estimate.  The former 
estimate is no longer statistically significant (just missing the 10 percent significance level).   The 
private detective and alarm system elasticities are larger (i.e., more negative) than their Newey-
West counterparts, although these estimates are also not statistically different from zero.  The 
locksmith elasticity remains positive and increases in magnitude after instrumenting, but is again 
found to be statistically insignificant.   
 Now consider the larceny regression.  The security guard elasticity remains negative  
( = -0.28) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level after instrumenting.  However, the 
difference-GMM point estimate is 3.7 times larger in magnitude relative to the Newey-West 
estimate.  Surprisingly, the private detectives elasticity remains positive after instrumenting and 
turns statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  On the other hand, the magnitude of the 
alarm system and locksmith elasticities falls after instrumenting, but both estimates remain 
statistically insignificant.       
 The Newey-West estimates of the impact of CCLs were consistently positive, and in 
three specifications the coefficient estimates were statistically significant.  However, after 
instrumenting six of the seven CCL coefficient estimates turn negative (the exception is robbery), 
but all are statistically insignificant.  These results suggest that CCLs may be endogenously 
related to crime rates, and as such, it may be necessary to instrument the law indicator in order to 
derive a consistent estimate of effect of these laws.32   Instrumenting the other deterrence 
variables has modest effects on their estimated elasticities (although in most instances the 
                                                 
32 Lott & Mustard (1997) present some results where the CCL dummy is instrumented and find that this 
treatment results in more negative impacts of the law’s effect.   Most studies that find a positive (crime-
enhancing) effect of CCLs (e.g., Ayres & Donohue 2003) do not attempt to instrument the law.  If the 
results presented here are any indication, such positive effects might reflect endogeneity bias rather than 
any tendency for CCLs to stimulate crime.     
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estimates move in the expected downward direction) and, with few exceptions, relatively little 
impact on the precision of those estimates.  
 
6 An analysis of UCR Part II Index offenses    
 While the results of the previous section suggest that some types of private security deter 
specific Part I crimes, such efforts may also affect the incidence of ‘less serious’ offenses.   The 
FBI also collects data on a large number of such offenses, known as Part II Index offenses, as part 
of the UCR.  These data consist of counts of arrests by state and year for each offense type as 
opposed to reported offenses.33 
 Because Part II arrests reflect an output of the law enforcement production function and a 
potential outcome of criminal activity, their relationship to private security is ambiguous.  For 
example, more security guards in an area may deter some Part II offenses from happening in the 
first place (‘pure’ deterrence), which would result in a negative relationship.  Conversely, a 
greater presence of security guards (who may observe crimes in progress) may facilitate the 
apprehension of criminals by public law enforcement, which would result in a positive 
relationship.   
The effect of private security on arrests may differ across the OES employment groups.  
Private security guards and detectives, to the extent that they are active ‘persons on the street,’ 
may tend to generate pure deterrence.  For example, a graffiti artist looking for an edifice to 
deface might observe the presence of private security guards and decide not to commit the 
offense.  In this case, positive variation in the employment of guards or detectives would be 
                                                 
33 Specifically, the UCR defines Part II Index offenses as consisting of: (1) ordinary (simple) assaults; (2) 
forgery and counterfeiting; (3) fraud; (4) embezzlement; (5) stolen property: buying, receiving, possessing; 
(6) vandalism; (7) weapons: carrying, possessing, etc.; (8) prostitution and commercialized vice; (9) sex 
offenses (other than forcible rate, prostitution, and commercialized vice); (10) drug abuse violations; (11) 
gambling; (12) offenses against the family and children; (13) driving under the influence; (14) liquor law 
violations; (15) disorderly conduct; (16) vagrancy; (17) all other offenses; (18) suspicion; (19) curfew and 
loitering (persons under 18 years of age); and (20) runaways (persons under 18 years of age).   
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negatively correlated with Part II arrests since the crime is never committed and, as a matter of 
consequence, no arrest is ever made.    
Crimes may not be directly deterred by the presence of more security system installers or 
locksmiths in an area.  Rather, the disembodied private security devices that they are responsible 
for installing or maintaining might make crimes more difficult to commit or make offenders 
easier to identify.  A CCTV camera may capture the graffiti artist in the process of the offense, 
and the video recording might be used by law enforcement to apprehend the offender.   Similarly, 
the offender may activate an alarm that would draw police to the crime scene and potentially lead 
to an arrest.  Hakim & Shachmurove’s (1996) survey analysis indicates that alarm systems do in 
fact aid in the detection of offenders: 19 percent of offenders apprehended for commercial 
burglaries were arrested on the premises of alarmed establishments while none were arrested on 
non-alarmed establishments.   If these types of effects hold generally, then higher employment 
levels of alarm installers or locksmiths (which are assumed to be positively related to the 
deployment of various security devices in an area) would tend to be positively correlated with 
higher Part II arrest rates.34   
 The above hypotheses may be tested by estimating a regression of the form 
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The variable i tA ,  denotes per-capita arrests for a given Part II offense, i tPolice , 1-  the once-
lagged police employment per-capita, and all other variables are defined analogously to equation 
(10) (except that i tD , 1-  no longer includes a measure of the crime-specific arrest rate).   
To the extent that, say, the activation of security alarms leads to the eventual involvement 
of public law enforcement efforts, the ultimate impact on the arrest rate may be a function of the 
                                                 
34 The arrests effectuated by these devices might themselves deter subsequent incidents of the offense from 
occurring, so it is also possible that increases in the employment rates of alarm installers or locksmiths 
might be negatively correlated with Part II arrest rates.  In either case, the issue is ultimately an empirical 
matter.   
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size of the police force.   For instance, more police per-capita may mean that there are more 
officers available to respond to such incidents, which in turn affects the probability of arrest.  
Thus, in equation (11) the effect of private security employment is allowed to vary with the level 
of the police force.  The elasticity of arrests with respect to the thj private security employment 
class is then given by j ji t Police
( ) ( ) *
,g x+ , where Police*  denotes the median value of per-capita 
police employment.   
 Since private security may be endogenous to arrests as well as crimes, equation (11) is 
also estimated via difference-GMM.35  The estimation results are voluminous and, in the interest 
of space, only a summary of the main results is presented here (the full results are available upon 
request).  The coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable is negative in all Part II 
specifications, which indicates mean reversion over the sample period.   The Sargan test indicates 
model misspecification in the suspicion, curfew, drunk driving, and drunkenness specifications.  
There may be a weak instruments problem in several other specifications (i.e., other assaults, 
forgery, fraud, vandalism, drug abuse violations, disorderly conduct, and liquor laws), and the 
autocorrelation test is significant in the gambling regression.  Thus, estimates obtained from these 
models should be interpreted with caution.   
There are eight Part II models for which the various specification tests are satisfied: 
embezzlement, stolen property, weapons carrying, prostitution, sex offenses, vagrancy, other 
offenses, and runaways.  The CCL coefficient estimate is negative in each case and statistically 
significant in the embezzlement, stolen property, prostitution, other offense,36 and ‘offenses 
against family and children’ regressions.  That the incidence of embezzlement might be lowered 
                                                 
35 The same identification strategy as used in estimating the Part I Index offense models is used, i.e., all 
private security employment variables (included the interaction terms), the (lagged) deterrence measures, 
and the lagged dependent variable are instrumented.   
36 A number of offenses reflected in this residual category might be deterred by the passage of CCL laws, 
including ‘abduction and compelling to marry;’ ‘kidnapping;’ ‘criminal syndicalism;’ ‘possession, repair, 
manufacture, etc., of burglar's tools; ‘public nuisances,’ ‘riot and route,’ and ‘trespass.’   See 
<http://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/uniform-crime-reporting-handbook/all-other-offenses.html>. 
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by allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons is, arguably, somewhat surprising.  The 
estimated effect on prostitution arrests also seems somewhat remarkable.37  The result for family 
offenses could reflect, e.g., the disincentive for violent, estranged husbands to abuse their 
relatives due to fear that an adult family member might have access to a concealed weapon 
following passage of a CCL.38    
The estimated elasticities on the private security employment variables as derived from 
the difference-GMM point estimates are shown in Table 5.  Elasticity estimates are presented for 
all Part II offenses.  A one percent increase in private security guard (locksmith) employment per 
capita is associated with a 4.4 (0.93) percent decrease (increase) in vagrancy arrests per capita.   
A one percent increase in alarm installer (locksmith) employment per capita is associated with a 
0.53 (0.61) percent increase in embezzlement arrests. While most of the individual private 
security employment elasticities are not estimated very precisely, the focus here is on the 
‘economic significance’ of the coefficients as they pertain to evaluating the relationship between 
private security and arrest rates, which in this instance is primarily informed by the signs of the 
coefficient estimates.39   
The bottom of the table summarizes the sign distributions of the estimated elasticities 
across the Part II regressions.  Recall that the presence of private guards and detectives might 
effectuate pure deterrence, which would lead to fewer arrests.  Sixty-eight percent of the security 
                                                 
37 One possible (albeit entirely speculative) explanation is that some such arrests may be incidental to 
instances where the buyers of sex services are apprehended for assaulting the prostitute (or vice versa).  If 
the adoption of CCLs deters such confrontations (e.g., because buyers believe that prostitutes may be more 
likely to be armed), then fewer prostitution arrests may result.   
38 The UCR defines offenses against the family and children as: “Unlawful nonviolent acts by a family 
member (or legal guardian) that threaten the physical, mental, or economic well-being or morals of another 
family member and that are not classifiable as other offenses, such as Assault or Sex Offenses.”  The 
following types of offenses are to be included in this category: (1) nonviolent cruelty to other family 
members; (2) nonviolent abuse; (3) desertion, abandonment, or nonsupport of spouse or child; (4) neglect 
or abuse of spouse or child (if injury is serious the offense is scored as an aggravated assault); (5) 
nonpayment of alimony; and (6) attempts to commit any of the above.   See 
<http://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/uniform-crime-reporting-handbook/offenses-against-the-family-and-
children.html>.  CCL laws might be expected to deter some incidents pertaining to (1), (2), and (4), but 
would probably not relate to (3) and (5).       
39 That is, rather than their magnitudes––although the median point estimate within each private security 
class is also presented at the bottom of the table.   
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guard elasticities are negative in sign, which is consistent with the hypothesis.  The results are 
even stronger with respect to private detectives: across all crime regressions the estimated 
detective elasticities are negative 89 percent of the time.   
Security systems and other protective devices might serve to facilitate arrests rather than 
deter crimes directly.  As such, the greater use of these measures (i.e., as proxied here through the 
per-capita alarm installer and locksmith employment measures) would tend to be positively 
correlated with arrests.  There appears to be some support for this hypothesis: 68 percent of the 
alarm installer elasticities are positive, as are 84 percent of the locksmith elasticities.   
 
7 Concluding remarks 
This paper presents new estimates of the effect of private protection efforts on Part I 
Index crime rates.  The results suggest that the greater presence of private detectives and 
investigators might deter murders.  Higher levels of employment in security system installation or 
locksmith/safe repairer activities are associated with fewer larcenies and burglaries.  Tests 
suggest potential model misspecification in the analysis of rape, assault, and auto theft, so the 
relationships between private security measures and these Part I crime rates cannot be 
conclusively determined. 
Part II Index offenses are also examined.  Concealed carry laws may deter the incidences 
of embezzlement, prostitution, stolen property, and familial abuse offenses.  Security guard 
employment is negatively correlated with vandalism arrests.   There appears to be a positive 
relationship between the employment of security guards/locksmiths and embezzlement arrest 
rates.  The nature of the relationship between private security and crime may vary by the ‘type’ of 
security investment.  The estimations provide some support for this hypothesis––most arrest-
security elasticities are negative with respect to private guards and detectives and positive with 
respect to security system installers and locksmiths.   These findings might reflect the tendency 
for private guards/detectives to deter crimes before they occur and for security systems and other 
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protective devices to facilitate in the arrest of offenders after crimes occur.   Further exploration 
of these hypotheses appears warranted. 
 A number of topics not addressed in this study would benefit from further investigation.  
Whether private security and public protection (e.g., policing) efforts are substitutes or 
complements in demand may have important implications for the optimal allocation of law 
enforcement efforts.   While the above results are suggestive to this issue, an analysis that more 
explicitly considers the demand interrelationships would be welcome.   
Another interesting question is what determines the demand for and supply of private 
security efforts over time.  There are a number of potential determinants besides crime and 
policing rates that may be relevant, including (but not limited to) the industrial organization of the 
security industry and laws that regulate the licensing of security firms or professionals.  Finally, 
there are number of other ways private entities can reduce their victimization risk, such as 
avoiding walking alone, leaving the lights on at night, and organizing community watch 
programs.  More granular data might allow for further study of such actions.   
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Figure 2.  OES private security occupation groups
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Security guards per 100,000 persons
Private detectives and investigators Alarm and security system installers Locksmiths and safe repairers Security guards
Industry   Employment  Industry  Employment  Industry  Employment  Industry  Employment 
Investigation and security 
services  560,380
Investigation and security 
services  17,180
Investigation and security 
services  25,920
Investigation and security 
services  13,610
Local government 34,630 State government   2,300
Building equipment 
contractors  18,600
Colleges, universities, and 
professional schools  1,070
General medical and surgical 
hospitals  33,130 Local government 1,240
Electrical and electronic 
goods merchant wholesalers  1,040
Elementary and secondary 
schools  370
Elementary and secondary 
schools  31,340 Legal Services  1,200
Machinery, equipment, and 
supplies merchant 
wholesalers  980 State government   340
Traveler accommodation  28,630 Business support services  1,030
Miscellaneous durable goods 
merchant wholesalers  530
General medical and surgical 
hospitals  280
Table 1.  Top five employment industries for various private security services (May, 2006)
Notes: Data are from the BLS Occupational Employment Statistics  series.  
Security Guards Private detectives and investigators Security and fire alarm system installers Locksmiths and safe repairers
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Private security guards per capita 343.36 246.97 61.17 1990.37
Private detectives and investigators per capita 9.95 4.83 1.88 43.89
Security and fire alarm systems installers per capita 14.61 7.41 2.20 45.35
Locksmiths and safe repairers per capita 5.91 3.84 0.61 34.36
Right‐to‐carry law 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00
Lagged police rate 283.87 91.54 146.51 831.37
Lagged incarceration rate 425.61 196.13 117.89 1885.02
Real per capita personal income 32772.56 7074.75 19566.71 66392.23
Population density 363.96 1292.33 1.09 9535.16
Poverty rate 11.70 3.16 4.50 21.30
Unemployment rate 4.74 1.15 2.30 8.10
Percent black 11.50 11.62 0.00 62.49
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics for select variables
Notes:  Figures represent annual state‐level data for the years 1999‐2006.   The number of observations ranges from 
316 to 408.  All per‐capita variables are per 100,000 state residents.
Murder Rape Robbery
Aggravated 
Assault Burglary Larceny Auto Theft
ln(Security guards per capita) ‐0.114 ‐0.048 ‐0.048 ‐0.030 ‐0.084 ‐0.075 ‐0.049
(1.06) (0.81) (0.60) (0.42) (1.86) (2.44) (0.77)
ln(Private detectives and investigators per capita) ‐0.026 0.010 ‐0.003 ‐0.006 ‐0.005 0.011 ‐0.018
(0.84) (0.61) (0.18) (0.35) (0.38) (1.24) (0.97)
ln(Security and fire alarm systems installers per capita) ‐0.020 0.006 0.001 0.006 ‐0.008 ‐0.009 ‐0.021
(0.57) (0.44) (0.06) (0.35) (0.60) (0.76) (1.21)
ln(Locksmiths and safe repairers per capita) 0.010 ‐0.013 0.024 0.011 0.009 ‐0.001 ‐0.011
(0.31) (0.79) (1.18) (0.68) (0.81) (0.12) (0.59)
Right‐to‐carry law 0.101 0.032 0.042 0.049 0.055 0.022 0.028
(2.24) (1.27) (1.54) (1.98) (3.29) (1.62) (1.03)
ln(Lagged dependent variable) ‐0.022 0.533 0.456 0.607 0.6 0.505 0.632
(0.32) (5.77) (5.86) (7.39) (9.86) (9.00) (10.83)
ln(Lagged crime‐specific arrest rate) ‐0.011 0.027 ‐0.016 0.007 ‐0.012 ‐0.001 0.007
(0.57) (1.44) (1.12) (0.37) (1.13) (0.07) (0.44)
ln(Lagged police rate) ‐0.392 0.225 ‐0.317 ‐0.024 ‐0.112 1.200E‐04 ‐0.297
(1.56) (1.43) (2.06) (0.16) (1.04) (0.00) (2.30)
ln(Lagged incarceration rate) ‐0.535 0.001 0.023 0.107 ‐0.022 ‐0.021 0.182
(2.83) (0.01) (0.23) (1.08) (0.29) (0.37) (1.74)
ln(Real per capita personal income) 0.135 0.523 0.371 0.265 0.375 0.107 0.641
(0.25) (1.53) (0.83) (0.91) (1.15) (0.37) (1.20)
ln(Population density) ‐0.433 0.064 0.113 0.203 ‐0.18 ‐0.18 0.689
(1.00) (0.21) (0.33) (0.52) (0.86) (1.37) (2.05)
Poverty rate ‐0.005 ‐0.006 1.178E‐04 ‐0.008 ‐0.003 ‐0.003 0.001
(0.52) (0.76) (0.02) (1.56) (0.62) (0.89) (0.18)
Unemployment rate ‐0.024 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.002
(1.07) (0.94) (0.31) (0.36) (0.49) (0.83) (0.11)
Percent black 5.274 ‐3.046 3.620 ‐2.289 ‐1.659 ‐0.193 ‐3.858
(1.23) (1.45) (1.44) (0.86) (0.83) (0.18) (1.69)
Constant 7.691 ‐4.056 ‐0.707 ‐1.092 1.383 4.242 ‐5.574
(1.30) (1.05) (0.14) (0.33) (0.43) (1.50) (1.08)
F (H0: All slopes = 0) 235.09 350.47 8164.58 881.06 633.21 412.64 449.38
Table 3.  The effect of private security efforts on crime: Newey‐West regressions
Notes: All regressions reflect state‐level data for the years 1999‐2006.  The dependent variable is the natural log of the relevant per‐capita UCR Part I 
crime.  Absolute value of t ‐statistics reflecting Newey‐West (HAC) standard errors in parentheses.  The number of observations in each column is 238.
Murder Rape Robbery
Aggravated 
Assault Buglary Larceny Auto Theft
ln(Security guards per capita) 0.123 ‐0.030 ‐0.186 ‐0.121 ‐0.153 ‐0.28 ‐0.106
(0.44) (0.16) (1.04) (0.60) (1.64) (2.69) (0.45)
ln(Private detectives and investigators per capita) ‐0.145 ‐0.050 ‐0.073 ‐0.059 ‐0.013 0.037 ‐0.103
(2.89) (1.33) (1.59) (1.33) (0.46) (1.73) (3.07)
ln(Security and fire alarm systems installers per capita) 0.052 0.003 ‐0.019 ‐0.042 ‐0.022 ‐0.013 ‐0.029
(0.65) (0.07) (0.38) (1.06) (0.70) (0.48) (0.73)
ln(Locksmiths and safe repairers per capita) 0.057 ‐0.015 0.053 0.032 0.027 0.002 0.033
(0.95) (0.37) (1.20) (0.65) (0.88) (0.11) (0.78)
Right‐to‐carry law ‐0.199 ‐0.096 0.097 ‐0.007 ‐0.018 ‐0.007 ‐0.073
(0.98) (1.02) (1.01) (0.06) (0.27) (0.17) (0.89)
ln(Lagged dependent variable) ‐0.347 0.015 0.057 0.361 0.332 0.335 0.452
(2.69) (0.10) (0.31) (1.95) (2.11) (2.16) (3.04)
ln(Lagged crime‐specific arrest rate) ‐0.023 ‐0.009 ‐0.020 ‐0.011 ‐0.060 0.005 0.017
(0.77) (0.20) (0.67) (0.18) (1.42) (0.22) (0.78)
ln(Lagged police rate) ‐0.817 0.156 ‐0.523 0.128 ‐0.072 ‐0.193 ‐0.212
(2.71) (0.76) (2.65) (0.47) (0.38) (1.70) (1.10)
ln(Lagged incarceration rate) ‐0.366 0.169 0.142 ‐0.005 0.049 ‐0.064 0.332
(0.86) (0.89) (0.55) (0.02) (0.24) (0.38) (1.81)
ln(Real per capita personal income) ‐0.403 0.328 0.217 0.368 0.523 0.300 1.05
(0.66) (1.13) (0.46) (1.29) (1.66) (0.89) (2.07)
ln(Population density) ‐0.687 ‐1.199 ‐0.349 ‐0.141 ‐0.527 ‐0.375 0.415
(0.57) (2.21) (0.55) (0.21) (1.21) (0.96) (0.60)
Poverty rate ‐0.016 ‐0.005 ‐0.007 ‐0.013 ‐0.002 ‐1.640E‐05 0.008
(1.83) (1.11) (1.29) (1.78) (0.50) (0.01) (1.15)
Unemployment rate ‐0.042 0.012 ‐0.008 0.002 0.003 0.002 ‐0.008
(1.35) (0.66) (0.52) (0.10) (0.21) (0.19) (0.41)
Percent black ‐1.176 ‐2.288 0.771 ‐0.446 ‐1.718 0.93 ‐2.462
(0.18) (0.74) (0.14) (0.12) (0.62) (0.32) (0.64)
F ‐statistic (H0: all slopes = 0) (p ‐value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of groups 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Number of instruments 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
IV regression diagnostics  (p ‐values):
Sargen test (H0: instruments are exogenous) 0.843 0.004 0.660 0.002 0.461 0.129 0.053
AR(1) test (H0: no first‐order autocorrelation in first‐
differences) 0.07 0.63 0.30 0.23 0.35 0.05 0.34
AR(2) test (H0: no second‐order autocorrelation in first‐
differences) 0.69 0.63 0.25 0.68 0.51 0.48 0.62
Weak instruments test:
Within‐group (lower bound) autoregressive coefficient  ‐0.424 ‐0.158 0.025 0.118 0.116 0.109 0.134
Pooled OLS (upper bound) autoregressive coefficient   0.857 0.970 0.967 1.000 0.995 0.956 1.003
Table 4.  The effect of private security employment on Part I Index crimes: one‐step difference‐GMM regressions
Notes: All regressions reflect state‐level data for the years 1999‐2006.  The dependent variable is the first‐difference of the natural log of the relevant per‐capita UCR 
Part I crime.  Absolute value of t ‐statistics reflecting cluster robust standard errors (with clustering taken at the state level) in parentheses.  The number of observations 
in each column is 176.
Part II Index crime
Security 
guards
Private 
detectives 
and 
investigators
Security and 
fire alarm 
system 
installers
Locksmiths 
and safe 
repairers
Other assaults (simple) ‐0.474 ‐0.335 0.047 0.193
(0.75) (1.26) (0.34) (1.15)
Forgery and counterfeiting ‐0.048 ‐0.258 ‐0.005 0.210
(0.09) (1.08) (0.03) (1.51)
Fraud ‐0.378 ‐0.236 0.075 0.390
(0.50) (1.41) (0.67) (2.46)
Embezzlement ‐0.677 ‐0.237 0.528 0.614
(0.59) (0.89) (2.07) (2.52)
Stolen property: buying, receiving, possessing ‐0.584 ‐0.215 0.002 0.398
(0.83) (0.86) (0.01) (2.46)
Vandalism 0.117 ‐0.186 0.024 0.182
(0.21) (0.89) (0.18) (1.11)
Weapons: carrying, possessing, etc. ‐0.904 ‐0.115 0.156 0.165
(1.53) (0.45) (0.88) (1.09)
Prostitution and commercialized vice ‐1.902 ‐0.347 0.869 ‐0.034
(1.27) (0.65) (1.59) (0.11)
Sex offenses† ‐0.404 ‐0.056 2.078E‐04 0.049
(0.63) (0.26) (1.00E‐04) (0.37)
Drug abuse violations ‐0.259 ‐0.105 0.005 0.148
(0.47) (0.39) (0.04) (0.95)
Offenses against the family and children ‐0.304 ‐0.183 0.316 0.198
(0.40) (1.21) (1.80) (1.19)
Liquor laws 0.413 ‐0.071 ‐1.104E‐04 0.175
(0.68) (0.31) (8.62 E‐04) (1.41)
Drunkenness 2.600 ‐0.104 ‐0.122 ‐0.233
(1.40) (0.44) (0.33) (0.68)
Disorderly conduct ‐0.132 ‐0.074 0.113 0.082
(0.28) (0.42) (0.75) (0.58)
Vagrancy ‐4.370 ‐0.006 ‐0.428 0.932
(1.78) (0.01) (0.88) (1.67)
All other offenses ‐0.291 ‐0.170 0.032 0.092
(0.62) (0.85) (0.18) (0.75)
Suspicion 3.055 0.211 ‐1.704 ‐0.896
(0.63) (0.27) (1.52) (0.86)
Curfew and loitering laws (persons under age 18) 1.799 0.044 0.169 0.024
(1.24) (0.17) (0.84) (0.14)
Runaways (persons under age 18) ‐1.237 ‐0.326 ‐0.005 0.155
(1.53) (1.50) (0.02) (1.06)
Summary:
Number of negative coefficients 13 17 6 3
Number of positive coefficients 6  2  13  16
Percent positive coefficients 32% 11% 68% 84%
Percent negative coefficients 68% 89% 32% 16%
Median point estimate ‐0.2977 ‐0.1701 0.0284 0.1647
Table 5.  Estimated arrest rate elasticities for Part II crimes
Estimated elasticity of Part II Index crime arrest rate with respect to a 
(log‐difference) unit increase in per‐capita:
Notes: †Excluding forcible rape, prostitution, and commercialized vice.  Absolute values of t ‐statistics are shown in parentheses.  
